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The international community’s conventional approach to peacebuilding in postconﬂict states has fallen
short of expectations despite the enormous resources devoted to the endeavor. The mainstream
response to disappointing peacebuilding outcomes has been to ﬁne-tune the model itself through a
series of tweaks to the mandates of peace operations and their modes of implementation.
But it is the underlying theory of peacebuilding that is at fault. A guided process of institutional
engineering to achieve simultaneous state-building and democratization becomes captured by elites,
who co-opt interventions to achieve their own political objectives. Only if we recognize how postcon-
ﬂict elites use peace operations to build their own preferred version of political order can we overhaul
the way we think about and pursue interventions to achieve more eﬀective and legitimate government.
International peacebuilders must abandon the notion that postconﬂict institutions can be designed and
transplanted in whole cloth. Instead they should focus on incremental governance improvements that
align with the incentives of postconﬂict leaders, while ensuring that the political space is expanded
beyond these elites.
What goes wrong with the standard transformative peacebuilding approach is on clear display in
Cambodia. The United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) was mandated in
1991 to create the foundations for sustainable peace in a country riven by genocide and two decades of
civil conﬂict. It ended its 2-year mission with a well-run election in May 1993. It was widely believed
that UNTAC had successfully completed a peace operation through a process of simultaneous state-
building and democratization, while jointly governing the country with Cambodian political elites.
Only 4 years later, however, the dominant Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) mounted an armed
coup against the royalist party with which it ostensibly co-governed in a power-sharing arrangement.
CPP elites have since conformed to the trappings of electoral democracy, while aiming for outright
political hegemony using the tactics of institutional conversion. Exploiting bureaucratic processes and
norms, CPP elites strengthened their control over the state and its lucrative patronage networks, build-
ing a system for generating rents and paying oﬀ rivals and supporters that runs parallel to the formal
structures of government. They have also thrived in a situation of institutional ambiguity, operating in
the spaces between patrimonial and legal–rational forms of authority. Within a decade of UNTAC’s
withdrawal, the carefully designed formal institutional and electoral space was no longer the true arena
of political contestation. Today, the political order in Cambodia is neopatrimonial, underpinned by the
instrumental exchange of patronage for political support, paired with the ever-present specter of vio-
lence against political opposition.
The international community’s approach to building sustainable postconﬂict peace rests on the
notion that a well-planned process of institutional engineering can transplant a modern political order
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—including stable rule of law, eﬀective government, and democratic legitimacy—into war-torn states.
But the Cambodian outcome is surprisingly typical of the countries in which such peacebuilding opera-
tions have been attempted. These states are certainly better oﬀ than they were before—but they are still
burdened with middling measures of rule of law, state capacity, and democratization. In other words, a
great deal of formal institutional change takes place in postconﬂict countries during interventions—but
actual governance outcomes in the aftermath of intervention are disappointing.
Critical theorists argue that this is evidence of the futility of any attempt to establish a modern polit-
ical order in postconﬂict countries. Yet the dominant positivist perspective in the peacebuilding litera-
ture accepts as given the feasibility of establishing such an order. If peacebuilding falls short of
expectations, the logic goes, then rationalist and probabilistic studies can reveal how interventions can
be adapted to better ﬁt speciﬁc postconﬂict contexts and thereby improve their chances of success.
In my book, The Peacebuilding Puzzle: Political Order in Post-Conﬂict States, I examine the inter-
national community’s failure to fully achieve its goals of establishing a rationalized bureaucracy and
electoral democracy in war-torn states. I argue that this outcome should be understood as a sign of the
success of domestic elites in pursuing their own governing vision and objectives. My research suggests
that the peacebuilding approach is itself partly responsible for the eventually disappointing governance
outcomes that emerge in postconﬂict countries. The two hallmark characteristics of the transformative
intervention template—joint international–domestic governance and the simultaneous pursuit of state-
building and democratization—generate unintended perverse eﬀects. Peace operations in Afghanistan,
Cambodia, and East Timor empowered a small subset of domestic power-holders with legitimacy and
other crucial resources, so that these elites were able to co-opt the intervention, close down political
space, and stunt state capacity. This happens because peacebuilders face a simple practical conundrum.
They want to be neutral in initiating the democratic process—but they also need counterparts for the
immediate task of reconstruction. By collaborating with peacebuilders, local elites gain an unmatchable
advantage in the run-up to electoral competition. In turn, they use their legitimately conferred authority
to beget more power in the aftermath of intervention.
What can be done to improve peacebuilding? Part of the answer is to have more modest goals.
Ambitious attempts to re-engineer what are, in reality, complex adaptive systems will invariably meet
with disappointment. A more clear-eyed and experimental approach to peacebuilding in postconﬂict
states will yield better results. Akin to new approaches to governance reform in developing countries,
international peacebuilders should focus on improving institutional function instead of ﬁxating on
transplanting institutional form. On the democratization side of the equation, moving toward electoral
legitimacy may mean preventing certain elites from contesting postconﬂict elections. One way of doing
this would be to insist that the leaders who are essential government caretakers over the reconstruction
process should be ineligible for elected oﬃce for some speciﬁed period of time after intervention. This
approach would meet the UN’s practical need for collaboration with domestic elites, without picking
winners and locking in a particular domestic power conﬁguration.
On the state-building front, incremental steps toward enhanced governance capacity might be
achieved if attempts to build postconﬂict order are approached in a diﬀerent way. Peacebuilders
should look at the world from the viewpoint of postconﬂict elites and factor their concerns into
intervention planning. This would mean abandoning the common approach of oﬀering predesigned
solutions and institutions that are actually at odds with elite interests. A more subtle approach,
attuned to institutional function, would focus on reforming and building the facets of the state that
serve and resonate with elite priorities. For example, as Cambodia faces the prospect of a uniﬁed
market within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, government and party oﬃcials have
elevated the importance of enhancing public education, infrastructure, and other planks of service
delivery. This oﬀers, in turn, an important opportunity for the many international actors still
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attempting to improve governance in the country. Capacity-building programs are more likely to
succeed if elites support them for their own purposes.
Peacebuilders should also look for ways to reduce their dependence on postconﬂict leaders. It is
tempting, but in the long run unwise, to rely heavily on domestic elites to deal with pressing problems
of reconstruction. Instead, it should be axiomatic for international interventions to facilitate the opening
and broadening of political space. Peacebuilders can encourage legitimate political opposition and
healthy political dialogue by supporting political party-building, traditional consensus and governance
mechanisms, and bottom-up forms of political participation. It is crucial to incorporate nonelite sources
of authority and legitimacy into a new version of peacebuilding.
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